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REGULATORY CHANGE AND THE
AVAILABILITY OF BANKING FACILITIES






Abstract. The issue of how financial institutions serve low-income
communities has recently been at the center of public debate. Enforce-
ment under the Community Reinvestment Act has been increased so
as to better promote such service, and the Riegle-Neal Act permitting
interstate branch banking was enacted only after the bill's proponents
pledged to better serve low-income consumers. Prior academic re-
search generally suggests that changes in bank regulations of this kind
should increase the availability of banking services in low-income
communities. Empirical evidence from the state of Texas, however,
shows this not to be the case. Indeed, the number of branches in low-
income areas were found to have decreased in the period following the
relevant regulatory changes. While the exact reasons for such a result
are unclear, this evidence raises questions about the possible impact
the Riegle-Neal Act may have on the country's low-income
communities.
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I. INTRODUCTION
OW do banks and other financial institutions serve low-income
communities? This question has recently been at the center of
public debate. Federal regulators recently completed rulemak-
ing changes to the Community Reinvestment Act ("CRA")1 , changes
designed to increase banking services and lending in low-income commu-
nities.2 On August 22, 1994, the U.S. Department of Justice announced
an historic, multi-million dollar settlement with Maryland's Chevy Chase
Federal Savings Bank3 for violations of federal fair lending laws. 4 The
thrust of the Justice Department's allegations against Chevy Chase was
the bank's failure to open branches in certain low-income, minority areas;
and, as part of the settlement, the bank agreed to open four branches and
mortgage offices in such areas. 5
On September 13, 1994, Congress passed the Riegle-Neal Interstate
Banking and Branching Efficiency Act,6 legislation overturning the Mc-
The authors benefited from the financial support of the Fundacion Caja de Madrid in
Spain and the Center For Business and Economic Analysis at Texas A&M University.
Professors Lawrence Baxter and Geoffrey Miller provided very helpful comments. Daniel
Sui and Gregory Ridenour provided excellent research assistance. The Texas Department
of Banking, especially Deputy Commissioner Randall S. James, provided valuable data and
information.
1. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2906 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
2. See Amendments to Regulations Promulgated under the Community Reinvest-
ment Act, 60 Fed. Reg. 22,156 (1995).
3. United States v. Chevy Chase Fed. Sav. Bank, [1994 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking
L. Rep. (CCH) j 90,166, at 85,434 (D.D.C. Aug. 22, 1994) [hereinafter Chevy Chase Fed.
Sav. Bank].
4. Chevy Chase was accused of violating the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-
3605 (1994) and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691a-1691f (1988 &
Supp. IV 1992). See Peter P. Swire, The Persistent Problem of Lending Discrimination: A
Law and Economic Analysis, 73 TEX. L. REV. 787, 831-32 n.235 (1995).
5. See Chevy Chase Fed. Sav. Bank, supra note 3. See generally Jonathan R. Macey,
Banking by Quota, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 1994, at A12; Paul C. Roberts, Holding Banks
Hostage Is a Rotten Way to Battle Bias, Bus. WEEK, Oct. 3, 1994, at 22.
6. See Riegle Community Development Act, Pub. L. No. 103-325, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N.
(108 Stat.) 1885.
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Fadden Act's 7 decades old prohibition against interstate branch banking.8
This new interstate banking law was passed, however, only after the bill's
banking industry proponents publicly pledged to provide better services
to low-income consumers. 9 Nevertheless, the issue has clearly been in the
forefront during the rash of recent Riegle-Neal-prompted bank mergers.
At the December 11, 1995 shareholders vote regarding the merger of
Chemical Banking Corp. and Chase Manhattan Corp., for example,
protesters expressed concern about the potentially "meager benefits" the
merger creating the nation's largest bank offered to low-income
neighborhoods.10
. Will the advent of interstate branch banking and changes in the CRA
result in better banking services for low-income consumers? Obviously,
the answer to this question turns in part on how one defines "services."
In an era of increasing technology, it may be possible for financial institu-
tions to provide a considerable number of consumer services without the
existence of actual brick-and-mortar branches.1' Indeed, as Cornell Uni-
versity Professor Jonathan R. Macey has noted, major nonbank mortgage
lenders such as Household International and Merrill Lynch frequently ex-
tend credit in areas where they lack an actual physical presence.
12
Nevertheless, as the recent Chevy Chase consent decree starkly points
out, the existence of an actual bank branch in a certain area can, at least
from a regulatory perspective, be seen as an important indicator of "ser-
Vice" and commitment to a given community. 13 Along these lines, this
Article examines the effect of regulatory initiatives on the change in the
number of bank and savings and loan branches between 1985 and 1993 in
the state of Texas, one of the three most populous states in the nation.'
4
These dates were chosen because they represent periods before and after
a major regulatory change-the advent of statewide branch banking in
the state of Texas. 15 The dates also represent periods before and after
7. 12 U.S.C. §§ 36, 321 (1988).
8. See Douglas H. Ginsburg, Interstate Banking, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1133, 1137(1981).
9. See Amy Barrett & David Greising, Right This Way, Mr. McCoU. Your Hot Seat Is
Ready, Bus. WEEK, Oct. 3, 1994, at 125 (citing pledges by NationsBank to provide assist-
ance in low-income areas while lobbying for interstate banking bill).
10. See Timothy L. O'Brien, Critics of Chase-Chemical Deal Worry Big Bank Mergers
Offer Little to Poor, WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 1995, at A14.
11. Computer programs such as "Quicken," for example, enable individuals to handle
a wide range of personal banking matters without ever even leaving their home. See Brett
Schlender, Bill Gates Makes Like J.P. Morgan, FORTUNE, Nov. 14, 1994, at 14.
12. See Jonathan R. Macey, Porkbarrel Banking, WALL ST. J., July 19, 1993, at A10.
13. See generally O'Brien, supra note 10 (discussing possible diminution in the number
of branches in low-income areas due to interstate banking and bank mergers and the im-
portance of such branches to community groups). See also Gary Putka and James S.
Hirsch, Fed Delays Vote on Fleet's Purchase of NatWest Bank, WALL ST. J., Apr. 11, 1996,
at A6.
14. During the time periods examined, Texas was the third most populous state in the
nation. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 28 (114th ed. 1994). Texas is
currently the country's second most populous state in the nation. See DEMOGRAPHICS
USA 1995-CourTY EDITION 2-3 (1995).
15. See infra notes 53-62 and accompanying text.
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Congress' 1989 enactment of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery
and Enforcement Act ("FIRREA") which significantly strengthened the
mandates of the CRA.16
What follows is an examination and analysis of the relevant data. Part
II provides an overview of the pertinent federal regulatory scheme, while
Part III gives a similar overview of the relevant state regulation. This
material is summarized in Part IV, and followed in Part V by a brief re-
view of relevant prior research. In Parts VI and VII we present and ana-
lyze our data, and in Part VIII we present our conclusions and their
implications. Overall, our data questions whether current financial indus-
try reforms will lead to increased bank branching service for low-income
communities.
II. FEDERAL REGULATORY SCHEME
A. COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT
The most important federal statute dealing with a financial institution's
service to low-income communities is the CRA. The statute, enacted in
1977, places upon each insured depository institution a "continuing and
affirmative obligation to help meet the credit needs of the local communi-
ties in which [it is] chartered" and requires that each such institution be
assessed on its "record of meeting the credit needs of its entire commu-
nity, including low- and moderate-income neighborhoods, consistent with
the safe and sound operation of such institution."' 17 The law's legislative
history reveals that its primary goal was to encourage financial institu-
tions to extend credit and promote lending opportunities in low- and
moderate-income neighborhoods.' 8 As such, the CRA can perhaps be
seen as something of an "affirmative action" statute going beyond requir-
ing that financial institutions not discriminate in their activities against
certain groups to actually mandating that they do business in low- and
moderate-income communities.19
In 1989, Congress enacted the FIRREA 20 which, as Professors
Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller have noted, put "teeth" into
the CRA.21 Post-FIRREA, financial institution CRA ratings are no
16. The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIR-
REA), Pub. L. No. 101-73, 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. (103 Stat.) 183, 527-28, significantly
strengthened the CRA by, among other things, lifting the confidentiality of CRA ratings.
The result has been stricter enforcement of the CRA. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey
P. Miller, The Community Reinvestment Act: An Economic Analysis, 79 VA. L. REV. 291,
300-02 (1993). See also Swire, supra note 4, at 805 (discussing FIRREA's strengthening of
the CRA).
17. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901(a)(3), 2903(1) (1994).
18. See 123 CONG. REC. 31,885-87 (1977) (statements of Sen. William Proxmire).
19. See Anthony D. Taibi, Banking, Finance, and Community Economic Empower-
ment: Structural Economic Theory, Procedural Civil Rights, and Substantive Racial Justice,
107 HARV. L. REV. 1463, 1467 (1994).
20. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L.
No. 101-73, 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. (103 Stat.) 183.
21. See Macey & Miller, supra note 16, at 302.
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longer confidential, 22 and the publication of these ratings has increased
political pressure on regulatory agencies to ensure CRA compliance.2
3
Moreover, federal regulators have become increasingly aggressive in de-
nying bank applications to expand on CRA grounds.24
One of the five factors upon which financial institutions are evaluated
under the post-FIRREA CRA is the geographic distribution and record
of opening and closing offices.25 There are two specific "assessment fac-
tors" within this general evaluative category. One of these specific fac-
tors, "Factor G" on the form used in conducting CRA evaluations, is
"[t]he institution's record of opening and closing offices and providing
services at offices."'26 Pursuant to this factor, regulators carefully ex-
amine the number of branches in the low- and moderate-income commu-
nities served by the financial institution.27 Given the 1989 amendments
to the CRA and the fact that the amended statute requires that regulators
specifically examine the number of bank branches in low- and moderate-
income communities, it would seem that the number of financial institu-
tion branches in such communities should have increased post-
FIRREA.28
B. EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT, HOME MORTGAGE
DISCLOSURE ACT, FAIR HOUSING ACT
In contrast to the "affirmative action"-type mandates of the CRA, the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act,29 the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act,30
and the Fair Housing Act 31 are essentially "nondiscrimination"-type stat-
utes. 32 Thus, while the CRA seeks to mandate that financial institutions
actually serve and lend in low- and moderate-income communities, the
goal of these other statutes is simply to ensure that financial institutions
do not discriminate in the provision of their services. 33 For example, the
Fair Housing Act prohibits discrimination in the sale or rental of residen-
22. See Swire, supra note 4, at 805.
23. See Macey & Miller, supra note 16, at 302.
24. Most significant forms of bank expansion require applications be subject to CRA
scrutiny. 12 U.S.C. § 2903 (1994). In recent years, federal regulators have become ex-
tremely aggressive about denying bank acquisition applications on CRA grounds.
Shawmut's National Merger Bid Fails as Fed Deadlocks Over Lending Record, 61 BNA's
BANKING REP. 789 (1993).
25. See Office of Thrift Supervision, Community Reinvestment Act Performance Evalu-
ation Form (on file with the Texas A&M Business School) [hereinafter CRA Evaluation
Form]. See generally Linda Corman, Bankers Brace for Life in Fishbowl as Era of CRA
Disclosure Begins, AM..BANKER, June 29, 1990, at 1, 16.
26. CRA Evaluation Form, supra note 25, at 5.
27. Id. at 4-5.
28. See generally A. Brooke Overby, The Community Reinvestment Act Reconsidered,
143 U. PA. L. REV. 1431, 1509-10 (1995) (discussing that the CRA is designed to encourage
branching in such areas).
29. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691a-1691f (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
30. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2810 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
31. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1994).
32. See generally Taibi, supra note 19; Swire, supra note 4, at 802-04.
33. Taibi, supra note 19.
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tial housing on the basis of race, religion, sex, or national origin. 34 Banks
and other specified financial institutions may not use those factors to
deny a housing loan application or discriminate among successful appli-
cants as to the terms and conditions of a housing loan.35
Similarly, although broader in scope, the Equal Credit Opportunity
Act ("ECOA") prohibits discrimination in the granting of all types of
credit on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, marital status, re-
ceipt of public assistance income, or the good faith exercise of rights guar-
anteed by the Consumer Credit Protection Act. 36 ECOA covers all
phases of credit transactions. 37
Finally, the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act supplements these other
statutes by mandating that mortgage lenders publicly disclose the race,
sex, and income of all mortgage applicants including those who were re-
jected.38 Recent data released pursuant to this statute purports to show
that some minority group members are rejected for mortgages more
often than whites even when they have similar incomes. 39
While on their face the Fair Housing Act and the ECOA appear to
focus on the direct non-discriminatory provision of credit, and have little
to do with bank branching, the recent Chevy Chase Case40 to some extent
suggests the contrary. In that case, the U.S. Department of Justice con-
vinced Chevy Chase Federal Savings Bank to sign a consent decree as
part of the settlement stating that the bank had violated the ECOA and
the Fair Housing Act by not opening branches in certain low-income mi-
nority areas.4' While the Justice Department's actions with respect to
Chevy Chase have been sharply criticized as representing governmental
"overreaching," 42 they clearly signal a concern on the part of federal reg-
ulators regarding the need for bank branches in low-income and minority
areas.
III. CHANGES IN THE TEXAS BANKING ENVIRONMENT
A. OVERVIEW
Two major and interrelated events dramatically affected the number
and size distribution of commercial banks and savings and loans (and
34. 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (1994).
35. Id.
36. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (1988).
37. See 12 C.F.R. § 202.1 (1993).
38. See 12 U.S.C. § 2803(b)(4) (1994).
39. See Glenn B. Canner & Dolores S. Smith, Expanded HMDA Data on Residential
Lending: One Year Later, 78 FED. RES. BULL. 801 (1992).
40. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
41. See Chevy Chase Fed. Say. Bank, supra note 3. Professor Peter Swire speculates
the bank simply did this to avoid heavy litigation costs and gain regulatory approval of its
expansion efforts. See Swire, supra note 4, at 831-32 n.235.
42. See Roberts, supra note 5. Cornell University Law Professor Jonathan Macey has
said that the government's willingness to proceed in the Chevy Chase Fed. Say. Bank case
in the absence of any evidence of discrimination is "scandalous." See Macey, supra note 5,
at A12.
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their offices) in the state of Texas in the late 1980s. The first event was
the collapse of the energy and real estate-based economy and the subse-
quent wave of failures among the lenders to those (and related) indus-
tries. The second was the metamorphosis of the state's banking laws and
regulations that for the first time permitted commercial banks to branch
throughout the state and also permitted out-of-state banking organiza-
tions to acquire Texas-based banks.
B. CRISIS IN THE TEXAS FINANCIAL INDUSTRY
The origins of the crisis that enveloped the Texas financial industry in
the late 1980s may be traced first to the surge in crude oil prices that
followed the OPEC oil embargo of 1973, and then to the decline of crude
oil prices that began in 1982 (and their subsequent collapse in 1986). 43
The increase in oil prices during the 1970s and 1980s greatly stimulated
the Texas economy, encouraged existing banks to expand their lending,
and led to an explosion in the number of new bank charters.44 Indeed,
371 new banks were chartered in Texas in the 1983-1985 period, repre-
senting 51% of all new bank charters in the United States.45 The subse-
quent decline in crude oil prices, however, produced an even greater
downward spiral in the Texas financial industry. During the 1980s, 349
Texas commercial banks failed, and 76 required FDIC financial assist-
ance. 46 The Texas bank failures represented almost 40% of the bank fail-
ures nationwide during the 1980's. 4 7 Similar patterns exist for savings and
loans. In fact, 468 Texas savings and loans became insolvent during the
1980-1988 period, representing almost 20% of all U.S. thrift insolvencies
during this period.48 The effects of the economy (and other factors) on
Texas savings and loans is revealed by trends in membership in the state
trade association. The number of members in the Texas Savings and
Loan League fell from 264 at the start of 1985 to 64 at the start of 1993,
roughly the period of our study.49
These failures of Texas banks and savings and loans did not, however,
generally result in the liquidation of the institutions and the closing of
43. J. O'Keefe, The Texas Banking Crisis: Causes and Consequences: 1980-1989, FDIC
BANKING REV., Winter 1990, at 1.
44. Thomas B. Fomby and Joseph G. Hirschberg, Texas in Transition: Dependence on
Oil and the National Economy, FED. RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS ECON. REV., Jan. 1989, at
11.
45. See O'Keefe, supra note 43.
46. Gunther reports that 39% of the new banks established in the 1980-1985 period
failed in the subsequent four years. See JEFFERY W. GUNTHER, FED. RESERVE BANK OF
DALLAS, PUB. No. 6-90, RISK AND FAILURE AMONG NEWLY ESTABLISHED TEXAS BANKS
10 (1990).
47. Kenneth J. Robinson, The Performance of Eleventh District Financial Institutions
in the 1980's: A Broader Perspective, FED. RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS FIN. INDUSTRY
STUD., May 1990, at 13-24. In the year 1989, almost 70% of all bank failures nationwide
occurred in Texas. See id.
48. Rebel A. Cole, Thrift Resolution Activities: Historical Overview and Implications,
FED. RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS FIN. INDUSTRY STUD., May 1990, at 1-11.
49. See TEXAS SAVINGS AND LOAN DIRECTORY (1994).
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their headquarters and branches. In most cases, the assets and liabilities
of the failed institutions (though not necessarily their physical facilities)
were acquired by an in-state or out-of-state entity-only 15 of the 396
Texas bank failures in the 1980-1989 period resulted in deposit payoff or
liquidation.50
C. STATE REGULATORY SCHEME
Directly related to the economic crisis facing Texas in the 1980s were
changes in the scheme of regulations facing the Texas financial services
industry, changes engendered in significant measure by the economic cri-
sis. Prior to 1986, Texas had extremely restrictive regulations governing
the ability of commercial banks in the state to branch, and the ability of
out-of-state banks to acquire banks in the state. All this changed dramat-
ically in 1986 during the state's financial crisis when it became evident
that branch banking was necessary to prevent a massive shrinkage in the
number of banking facilities due to the simultaneous existence of bank
failures and lack of potential acquirers. 51 In addition, it became evident
that the state would have to permit out-of-state acquirers to enter the
Texas market in order to inject capital into the state's banking system,
and that out-of-state banking organizations would be more interested in
entering the market if branching restrictions were liberalized.52
During the summer of 1986 a special session of the Texas Legislature
was called to address these issues. The Legislature enacted interstate
banking legislation which permitted out-of-state bank holding companies
headquartered in any state to acquire banks or bank holding companies
located in Texas. 53 Interestingly, the Texas Legislature also directly incor-
porated the CRA into this new legislation in an effort to guarantee that
any out-of-state acquirers would be responsive to local credit needs in
Texas. 54
During the same special legislative session, the Texas Legislature
passed an amendment to the state constitution which permitted county-
wide branch banking for commercial banks in the state.5 5 State voters
approved this amendment on November 4, 1986.56
Despite the liberalization of branching restrictions contained in the
1986 legislation, commercial bankers in the state still felt disadvantaged
50. See Robinson, supra note 47. Also, by October 1988, 53 insolvent thrift institu-
tions in Texas with assets totaling $21.8 billion had been resolved under the so-called
Southwest Plan. Genie D. Short & Jeffery W. Gunther, The New Financial Landscape in
Texas, BANKERS MAG., Mar./Apr. 1989, at 15.
51. Texas Governor White Signs Interstate Banking Bill, Opens New Era In State,
WASH. FIN. REP. (BNA) Vol. 47, at 501-02 (Sept. 29, 1980).
52. Id. at 501.
53. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 342-101 to 342-901 (Vernon 1973 & Supp.
1995).
54. See Stephen K. Huber, Interstate and Branch Banking Come to Texas, HOUSTON
LAWYER, Jan.-Feb. 1987, at 36-38.
55. See TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. arts. 342-903 & 342-910(a) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
56. See TEXAS CONST. art. XVI, § 16d(e).
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vis-A-vis state savings and loan associations which were allowed to branch
state-wide as opposed to county-wide.57 The commercial bankers argued
that under federal law, and under the "parity provision" of the Texas
Constitution,58 they should be afforded the same branching rights and
privileges afforded state savings and loans. The U.S. Comptroller of the
Currency upheld this argument from Texas commercial bankers,59 and in
a landmark June 1988 test case, a federal court upheld the Comptroller's
decision permitting Texas commercial banks to branch state-wide. 60
In response to this federal court decision, Texas State Banking Com-
missioner Kenneth Littlefield issued a ruling permitting commercial
banks to branch state-wide under the "parity clause" of the Texas Consti-
tution on October 26, 1988.61 During its regular 1989 session, the Texas
Legislature then amended the state banking code to permit state-wide
branching for commercial banks.62
IV. SUMMARY
The years 1986-1989 represented a period of incremental reductions of
the restrictions on branch banking in the State of Texas. It also repre-
sented a period during which Texas opened its borders to out-of-state
banks, so long as these banks agreed to serve the needs of the state's low-
and moderate-income communities. At the federal level, the 1989
amendments to FIRREA, effective in 1990, considerably strengthened
the CRA with regulators now specifically examining institutions' records
in terms of branch office availability. Consequently, one would expect
the coupling of fewer branch banking restrictions and increased CRA en-
forcement to have resulted in an increase in branch office availability in
Texas in low- to moderate-income communities over the period from
1985-1993.
V. IMPLICATIONS OF PRIOR RESEARCH
The expectation that the accessibility of banking facilities should in-
crease with liberalized branching regulations is also supported by prior
research. For example, Seaver and Fraser analyzing 219 standard metro-
politan areas found that the population per banking office is substantially
less in branching than in unit banking states. 63 More recently, Evanoff
measured the number of banking offices per square mile for both metro-
politan and nonmetropolitan areas and found that the accessibility to
banking offices is improved for both urban and rural areas when branch-
57. See generally TEXAS BANKERS ASSOCIATION, STATEWIDE BRANCHING UPHELD
(1988) [hereafter Statewide Branching].
58. See TEXAS CONST. art. XVI, § 16(c).
59. See Statewide Branching, supra note 57.
60. See State v. Clarke, 690 F. Supp. 573 (W.D. Tex. 1988).
61. See 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.91 (West 1996) (Texas Finance Commission).
62. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 342-903 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
63. William Seaver & Donald Fraser, Branch Banking and The Availability of Banking
Services in Metropolitan Areas, J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS, Mar. 1979, at 153.
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ing is allowed. 64 Indeed, Evanoff found that "holding demographic fac-
tors constant, branching increases the number of banking offices per
square mile by 65 percent. '65
A number of other studies have addressed related though not identical
issues. Most of these studies have focused on the issue of whether the
level of branches per capita differs by income and racial status.66 For
example, Avery found that low-income and minority zip code areas in
Atlanta, Boston, Cleveland, Detroit, and Philadelphia had fewer
branches per capita in 1989 than other areas.67 However, these findings
lost their significance once other economic variables were added to the
analysis. Moreover, when Avery examined the change in the number of
offices (per capita) from 1977 to 1989, he observed no significant associa-
tion between that variable and the income and minority status of the
area.68 In a separate study, Caskey examined branch bank locations in
Atlanta, Denver, New York City, San Jose, and Washington, D.C. in the
period from 1970 through 1989.69 Using census tracts as the measure of
the market area, he found that in two of the cities studied, low-income
areas are "significantly less likely to have a local bank than are other
communities. In the other three cities, this is not the case," and "commu-
nities with a majority of African-American residents were substantially
less likely to have a local bank compared to other communities. '70 In
addition, using regression analysis, Caskey found that "even after control-
ling for differences in income levels, communities with higher percentages
of African-American or Hispanic residents are less likely to have bank
branches. 71
Based upon this prior research, we would expect that the number of
bank and savings and loan offices in low-income areas should have in-
creased in Texas following the advent of state-wide banking. While this
regulatorily-induced change might be obscured by the effects of the Texas
financial crisis, or by increases in technology which may make it possible
for financial institutions to provide consumer services without the exist-
ence of actual brick-and-mortar branches, the focus of our analysis is on
the relative change in banking offices in low- as contrasted with high-in-
64. Douglas Evanoff, Branch Banking and Service Accessibility, J. MONEY, CREDIT &
BANKING, May 1988, at 191-201.
65. Id. at 201.
66. There are a number of other dimensions of banking services in addition to office
availability. Much of the research on these other dimensions has focused on the issue of
racial discrimination in lending, a topic that is outside the scope of our study. For a recent
representative study, see Andrew Holmes & Paul Horvitz, Mortgage Redlining: Race,
Risk, and Demand, 49 J. FIN. 81 (1994).
67. Robert Avery, Deregulation and Location of Financial Institution Offices, FED. RE-
SERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND ECON. REV., 3rd Quarter 1991, at 30.
68. Id.
69. JOHN P. CASKEY, FED. RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY, PUB. No. 92-10, BANK
REPRESENTATION IN LOW-INCOME AND MINORITY URBAN COMMUNITIES (1992).
70. Id. at 1.
71. Id. at 2.
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come areas rather than on whether the number of offices increased or
decreased for all areas.
Prior research and analysis also generally suggest that increased en-
forcement of the CRA should lead to increased availability of banking
facilities in low-income areas. Taibi refers to the CRA as serving a "re-
medial/affirmative action" purpose of providing greater service to low-
income areas. 72 He notes that post-FIRREA CRA regulations have spe-
cifically called for regulators to examine institutional records of opening
and closing branches and other information indicating the servicing of
low-income areas. 73 Indeed, Lawrence Lindsey, the member of the Fed-
eral Reserve Board of Governors responsible for the CRA, has recently
stated that the CRA exists "to help prod banks to serve ... historically
underserved areas and populations" and that regulators need to push
banks to serve such communities.74 Swire notes the CRA's role in serv-
ing low- and moderate-income communities and in dealing with problems
of residential segregation. 75 Overby, in a recent analysis of the CRA,
asserts that the statute is specifically designed to encourage financial in-
stitution branching in low-income areas.76
Macey and Miller, however, have offered a counterintuitive argument
explaining why stricter enforcement of the CRA might lead to fewer bank
branches in low-income neighborhoods. 77 They note that since bank
CRA ratings are based on bank lending and other practices in the areas
contiguous to their offices, banks will be reluctant to open or maintain
offices in low-income areas since regulators will then force them to
devote a larger proportion of their resources to such areas than they de-
sire.78 Macey and Miller thus observe that the CRA may have the per-
verse effect of making banks less likely to have branches in poor areas. 79
Overby, however, directly disputes this contention by Macey and Miller
by arguing that regulators are likely to assign low CRA ratings simply for
a financial institution's refusal to enter low-income areas.80
VI. MARKET DEFINITION, DATA, AND METHODOLOGY
A. MARKET DEFINITION
Traditional definitions of banking markets such as Standard Metro-
politain Statistical Areas ("SMSAs") were considered too broad for the
72. Taibi, supra note 19, at 1484.
73. See id. at 1489 n.105. See also CRA Evaluation Form, supra note 25 (Factor "G").
74. Letters, REGULATION, Issue 11995, at 2-3 (letter from Lawrence B. Lindsey, Mem-
ber, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System).
75. Swire, supra note 4, at 829-33.
76. Overby, supra note 28, at 1509-10.
77. Macey & Miller, supra note 16, at 314-15, 340.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 314.
80. Overby, supra note 28, at 1509. The heretofore highly subjective nature of CRA
ratings makes it difficult to know exactly how regulators operate in this regard. See Macey
& Miller, supra note 16, at 326-30; Peter P. Swire, Safe Harbors and a Proposal to Improve
the Community Reinvestment Act, 79 VA. L. REV. 349, 369-77 (1993).
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analysis required in this study. Performing this analysis at the SMSA
level could lead to an aggregation problem in which critical differences in
income and banking services among neighborhoods within an area would
be lost. Hence, we analyze the availability of banking services at a zip
code level. Although even lower levels of aggregation are feasible (for
example, the census track), the zip code was the lowest level of aggrega-
tion at which all the necessary data are publicly available.
A distinctive characteristic of our analysis is the use of two alternative
measures of the relevant market for availability of banking services. In
its narrowest definition, we can consider the geographical market for
banking services to be primarily at the zip code level, in which case we
should only consider the availability of banking services in the zip code
area. However, zip codes are not of homogeneous size. Some zip codes,
particularly urban ones, are relatively small, while rural zip codes have
greater geographical extension. In urban areas it is possible that banking
services are available to a population not within the zip code itself, but in
other adjacent zip codes which are at a convenient distance. To account
for that possibility, we consider alternative definitions of the area where
banking services should be available. Thus, we also examined the availa-
bility of banking services in zip codes located within a two mile distance.
This measure reflects a more homogeneous definition of the relevant
market across the sample. Increasing the size of the relevant market,
however, may dilute the possible effect of income and poverty levels on
the localized availability of banking services.
B. DATA
We created a database consisting of information on: (a) the demo-
graphic characteristics of the zip code (including population, average
household income, racial composition, and number of people below the
poverty line); (b) geographic information which located each zip code in
the geographic coordinates (thus allowing us to calculate distances among
any pair of zip codes); and (c) banking information from which we ob-
tained the number of offices of banks and savings and loan associations
("SLAs") in each zip code in 1985 (before the regulatory changes) and in
1993 (after the regulatory changes).
The U.S. Census of Population and Housing is the only source of relia-
ble demographic information at the zip code level. This Census takes
place every ten years, the last one occurring in 1990.81 We extracted the
SMSA classification of each zip code in Texas, as well as relevant demo-
graphic information including the population in the zip code, average
household income, percentage of non-Hispanic whites, and percentage of
people in the zip code above the poverty status level.8 2
81. We used the Summary Tape File (STF) 3B available in CD-ROM from the U. S.
Census Bureau which covers population, housing, and economic items at the zip code level.
82. Poverty status refers to a household below a poverty threshold which takes into
account family size, number of children, and age of the family householder. See DOWELL
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For geographical location information a file providing the latitude and
longitude of the centroids of all the zip codes in Texas was obtained from
the software ATLAS GIS.83 These spherical coordinates were used to
calculate the distance between any two zip codes in Texas using the pro-
cedure provided by Muehrcke and Muehrcke.84 Using that distance mea-
sure allowed us to determine which zip codes were within a desired
distance from any given zip code.
For banking information, we obtained data compiled by Sheshunoff In-
formation Services, Inc. on the offices of banks and savings and loan insti-
tutions in Texas as of June 1985 and June 1993. Sheshunoff obtains data
on all federally insured banks from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo-
ration ("FDIC"), and on all federally insured savings and loan institutions
from the Office of Thrift Supervision ("OTS"). We then calculated the
number of offices of each type of lending institution in every zip code in
1985 and 1993. This allowed us to measure the number of combined bank
and SLA offices in the zip code. This extended definition of banking serv-
ices (rather than just using the number of banks) was selected in order to
avoid any bias introduced by the collapse of the SLA industry in Texas.
As a result of the crisis, many banks acquired SLA offices and thus
greatly increased the number of banking offices. By defining the depen-
dent variable as the sum of bank and SLA offices, the effect of the SLA
crisis is absorbed within the variable of interest.
These three sources of information were pooled in a single file coded
by zip code. These 1657 zip codes were then classified into three catego-
ries representing geographically homogeneous sets of zip codes. These
categories include: (a) zip codes in the four largest metropolitan SMSAs
(Austin, Dallas-Fort Worth, Houston-Galveston-Brazoria, and San
Antonio); (b) zip codes in other SMSAs in Texas;85 and (c) zip codes in
non-SMSA (rural) areas.
Zip codes for SMSAs were classified as being in the top 25%, medium
50%, or bottom 25% of the distribution within their respective SMSA in
terms of average household income, percent above poverty line, and per-
centage of non-Hispanic whites. For non-SMSA (rural) areas, zip codes
were similarly ranked and classified within the set of rural zip codes.
Thus, income, poverty, and minority ranks are based on comparisons with
other zip codes within the same city or homogeneous category rather
MYERS, ANALYSIS WITH LOCAL CENSUS DATA 33 (1992) (discussing definitions of census
variables).
83. This file determines the location of the centroid of the zip code area, calculated by
averaging the point of the zip code boundary. This file is compiled by Geographic Data
Technology which makes it available to mapping software firms.
84. PHILLIP MUEHRCKE & JULIANA 0. MUEHRCKE, MAP USE 221-25 (2nd ed. 1986).
85. Other SMSAs in Texas, with the number of zip codes in each, are as follows: Abi-
lene (12), Amarillo (15), Beaumont-Port Arthur (23), Brownsville-Harlingen (11), Bryan-
College Station (6), Corpus Christi (27), El Paso (23), Killeen-Temple (22), Laredo (5),
Longview-Marshall (13), Lubbock (19), McAllen-Edinburg-Mission (16), Midland (4),
Odessa (8), San Angelo (9), Sherman-Denison (13), Texarkana (8), Tyler (15), Victoria (4),
Waco (21), and Wichita Falls (13).
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than on absolute levels of income, poverty, or minority presence. These
classifications allow us to focus on the question of whether the availability
of banking services within individual cities or rural areas has changed dif-
ferentially for low-income, poor, or minority areas, as compared to other
areas within the same city or homogeneous category.
C. METHODOLOGY
The focus of our analysis is on the change in the number of branches.
A method often used in this type of analysis is to construct a change score
(Ytl - Y,) or a percent change ((Y,,, - Y,)/Y,) as a dependent variable.
Although these methods to measure change are often observed in prac-
tice, they both suffer from an important drawback, the regression to the
mean effect-or simply, regression effect.86 This effect occurs when sub-
jects that had large disturbances in the first observation period (unusually
large values) display lower growth (or higher decline) than those with
initially lower disturbances.
For example, a particular area (A1) may have a relatively large number
of financial institutions (considerably above the mean for all areas at time
t) while another area (A 2) may have few financial institutions at time t.
When the number of financial institutions is observed at time t+1, A1 may
be expected to have experienced a decline in the number of institutions
while area A2 may be expected to have experienced an increase. This
regression toward the mean cannot be uniquely attributed to the in-
dependent variables of interest, since it is caused by the unusually large
or small initial number of institutions. Therefore, the use of difference
scores to measure change would not permit valid inferences to be drawn
regarding the impact of such variables of interest as income and race.
Several researchers have suggested a model with lagged values of the
dependent variable on the right side of the equation in order to develop
explicitly dynamic models. 8 7 These models are generally of the following
form:
Y+ 1=a+Yt+YF3iXit+e,
where Y,+, is the value of the dependent variable at time t+l, Yt is the
value of the dependent variable at time t, X, represents all the variables
which influence the amount of change in the dependent variable between
the two observations, a is a constant, and e is an error term. Such a
model explicitly addresses the regression effect by including the influence
of initial values of the dependent variable upon subsequent values.
In our analysis, in addition to the lagged dependent variable, two in-
dependent variables are used to explain the change in office availability
86. See GREGORY B. MARKUS, ANALYZING PANEL DATA (1979) and SCOTT MENARD,
LONGITUDINAL RESEARCH (1991).
87. See Lee J. Cronbach & Lita Furby, How We Should Measure Change-Or Should
We?, 74 PSYCHOL. BULL. 68, 68-80 (1970); RONALD C. KESSLER & DAVID F. GREENBERG,
LINEAR PANEL ANALYSIS: MODELS OF QUANTITATIVE CHANGE (1981); and IAN PLEWIS,
ANALYSING CHANGE (1985).
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between 1985 and 1993: (a) the population in the zip code (people) and
(b) the income status of the zip code (represented by a set of dummy
variables indicating whether the zip code is among the lowest quartile of
income zip codes, the 50% medium-income, or the highest quartile of
income, within the SMSA or homogeneous category). These dummy
variables test the differences between the two groups of interest (low- and
moderate-income) and the control group (high-income).
Two main statistical tests are employed to draw results from the coeffi-
cients of the estimated models. We report first the results of an F-test of
non-existence of income effects on the changes in banking service availa-
bility, in which the null hypothesis is that the zip codes of low-, medium-,
and high-income zip codes have the same average change in number of
branches, after controlling for population. We also report a t-test of the
difference between the high- and low-income areas within a homogene-
ous category in terms of service change. This test contrasts the differ-
ences in number of branches between zip codes in high- and low-income
areas of an SMSA or homogeneous category. The null hypothesis in this
case is that both groups (high- and low-income zip codes) have the same
average change in number of branches, after controlling for population.
VII. EVIDENCE
A. UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS
Table One provides basic population and demographic information on
Texas grouped as follows: each of the major metropolitan areas in the
state (the major urban areas category); the smaller metropolitan areas
(the other MSA category); and the non-metropolitan communities (the
non-MSA category). For each of these geographic categories, zip codes
in those areas were separately classified by income, by the percentage of
the population with income below the poverty level, and by the percent-
age of the population composed of non-Hispanic whites. The classifica-
tion depended on the zip code's ranking of those variables within their
respective SMSA or homogeneous area (for rural areas). Thus, the 405
lowest-income zip codes in Texas include the lowest quartile of zip codes
in terms of income for each SMSA and the lowest quartile of zip codes in
terms of income among rural areas. Similarly, the 140 highest-income zip
codes in major urban areas represent the highest quartile of zip codes in
terms of income for each of the four major metropolitan areas in Texas.
Our interest centers on the top and bottom quartiles.
Looking initially at the entire state, the 1657 zip codes contained an
average of 10,245 people with an average household income of $31,865.
This initial overall view also revealed that 18.4% of the population re-
ported income below the poverty level and 70.2% of the population con-
sisted of non-Hispanic whites (most of the remaining individuals would
be African-American or Hispanic). Breaking the data down by income,
poverty status, and minority status is particularly interesting. The aver-
age income of households in the top-quarter of the zip codes is more than
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double that of households in the bottom-quarter ($44,876 versus $21,760).
Only 10.8% of families in the top-quarter are below the poverty level
(versus 29.0% for the lowest income quartile) and less than 20% are mi-
nority (versus almost 50% for the bottom quartile income zip codes). Di-
viding the zip codes by poverty and racial status provides similar evidence
of disparities. The zip codes with a high level of poverty have much lower
incomes of $23,449 (versus $40,764 for the zip codes with the least pov-
erty), are much more populated with minorities (more than 50% versus
about 15% for the zip codes with the least poverty) and have poverty
rates almost five times those of zip codes with the least poverty. Classify-
ing the zip codes by racial mix indicates that those zip codes with the
largest fraction of non-Hispanic whites have higher incomes ($36,726 ver-
sus $25,407) and less poverty (12.2% versus 28.7%) when compared to
the minority zip codes.
Table 1
Division of Texas Population by Geographic Area, Income
Rank, Poverty Rank, and Minority Rank, 1990
Number
of Zip Total Persons Average Poverty
Codes Persons Proportion per Zip Income Index Majority
TOTAL TEXAS 1,657 16,976,68 1.00 10,245 31,865 18.4 70.2
INCOME Lowest Income 405 3,712,45 0.22 9,167 21,760 29.0 54.6
Quartile
RANK Middle Income Half 831 8,902,22 0.52 10,611 30,339 17.1 72.6
Highest Income
Quartile 414 4,361,99 0.26 10,562 44,876 10.8 80.7
POVERTY Lowest Poverty 405 3,594,45 0.21 8,875 40,764 7.2 84.1
Quartile
RANK Middle Poverty Half 839 8,706,27 0.51 10,377 31,712 16.9 74.8
Hig best Poverty
Quartile 413 4,675,95 0.28 11,322 23,449 32.4 47.4
MINORITY Lowest Non- 405 5,325,08 0.31 13,148 25,407 28.7 38.2
Hispanic White
Quartile





Quartile 413 2,550,88 0.15 6,176 36,726 12.2 91.8
MAJOR URBAN AREAS 560 9,674,45 1.00 17,276 40,478 13.4 66.8
INCOME Lowest Income 139 2,490.45 0.26 17,917 24,591 25.7 41.6
Quartile
RANK Middle Income Half 281 4,902,21 0.51 17,446 37,250 11.3 71.1
Hig hest Income
Quartile 140 2,281,78 0.23 16,298 62,732 5.3 83.3
POVERTY Lowest Poverty 139 2,241,03 0.23 16,123 56,716 3.4 82.6
Quartile
RANK Middle Poverty Half 281 4,616,81 0.48 16,430 39,710 11.1 73.4
Highest Poverty
vartile 140 2,816,60 0.29 20,119 25,899 27.8 37.9






281 5,208,53 0.54 18,536 41,561 10.3 72.8
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Number
of Zip Total Persons Average Poverty
Codes Persons Proportion per Zip Income Index Majority
Highest Non-
Hispanic White
Quartile 140 1,410,05 0.14 10.072 51.139 7.2 90.8
OTHER MSA 287 4,182,57 1.00 14,573 29,975 20.0 62.9
INCOME Lowest Income 64 780,25 0.19 12,191 21,222 30.6 46.9
Quartile
RANK Middle Income Half 152 2,172,79 0.52 14,295 28.770 19.3 64.3
Highest Income
Quartile 71 1,229,52 0.29 17,317 40,446 11.9 74.2
POVERTY Lowest Poverty 64 850,69 0.20 13,292 36,973 9.0 76.1
Quartile
RANK Middle Poverty Half 152 2,197,83 0.53 14,459 30,609 18.6 66.3
Highest Poverty
Quartile 71 1,134,04 0.27 15,972 22,310 32.7 43.6
MINORITY Lowest Non- 64 1,260,12 0.30 19,689 23,225 30.2 38.7
Hispanic White
Quartile




Quartile 71 777,12 0.19 10,945 35,252 12.6 80.6
NON-MSA 810 3,119,65 1.00 3,851 26,581 21.3 75.2
INCOME Lowest Income 202 441,74 0.14 2,187 19,982 30.7 66.0
Quartile
RANK Middle Income Half 406 1,827,22 0.59 4,501 26,143 20.3 76.8
Hig hest Income
Quartile 202 850,69 0.27 4,211 34,058 14.2 81.1
POVERTY Lowest Poverty 202 502,73 0.16 2,489 30,989 9.3 87.8
Quartile
RANK Middle Poverty Half 406 1,891,62 0.61 4,659 26,591 20.3 78.9
Hi ghest Poverty
Quartile 202 725,30 0.23 3,591 22,152 35.6 55.2
MINORITY Lowest Non- 202 1,009,09 0.32 4,995 24,624 30.2 43.3
Hispanic White
Quartile





Quartile 202 363,70 0.12 1,801 27,255 15.6 96.5
The population of the zip
seemingly related to poverty
codes varies considerably, with the levels
and racial status. Zip codes which have a
lower poverty level and greater fraction of the non-Hispanic white popu-
lation tend to have smaller populations, a factor that is relevant in under-
standing the distribution of branch locations. The variations in
population for high and low minority representation is particularly strik-
ing. Those zip codes that fall into the highest quartile on the basis of
percentage of the population that is non-Hispanic whites have an average
population of only 6176. This compares with an average population of
13,148 for those zip codes with the lowest percentage of non-Hispanic
whites.
There are also considerable differences in the distribution of income
and racial characteristics throughout the state. The major metropolitan
areas have higher incomes than the smaller metropolitan areas (and Aus-
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tin and Dallas-Ft. Worth stand out among those areas) while the smaller
metropolitan areas have higher incomes than the non-metropolitan areas.
Also, the major metropolitan areas have smaller fractions of their popula-
tions with income below the poverty level than either the smaller metro-
politan or the non-metropolitan areas. The pattern is much more mixed
regarding racial composition, with rural Texas having the highest percent-
age of non-Hispanic whites.
Tables Two and Three provide information on the number of commer-
cial banks and savings and loans and the change in these numbers for the
entire state of Texas as well as for selected subunits of the state.88 Table
Two presents the number of commercial bank and savings and loan
branches, for 1985 to 1993, classified both by zip codes and by a two-mile
radius criterion. Looking initially at the entire state, we note that the
number of bank and SLA branches per zip code contracted slightly from
1985 to 1993 (2.04 in 1985 to 1.93 in 1993, a decline of 5%). The number
also falls when the market area is measured in terms of a two-mile radius
(from 2.66 in 1985 to 2.52 in 1993 or 5%). This contraction in the number
of branches reflects a nationwide trend as banks rely less on "bricks and
mortar" to deliver banking services.89 The tremendous turmoil in the
banking industry in Texas during this period provided great flexibility for
Texas banks to accelerate this trend. The changes in the number of bank
and SLA branches that are discussed below must be interpreted within
this context of declines generally in the number of branches.
Dividing the data by income, poverty, and racial ranks produces some
interesting patterns. As Table Two shows, for the state as a whole the
average number of branches per zip code for the highest-income quartile
zip codes stayed roughly constant (2.54 versus 2.55) but declined by 11%
for the lowest-income quartile areas (from 1.54 to 1.38). This reduction in
the number of branches for the lowest-income zip codes is particularly
striking. A similar pattern is observed when the zip codes are stratified
by percentage of the population with incomes below the poverty level. In
fact, those zip codes that had the highest (quartile) percentage of resi-
dents living in poverty experienced a sharp 13% decline in the availability
of bank and SLA branches (from 2.03 to 1.76). This pattern is consistent
when the zip codes are classified by racial characteristics. Dominantly
white zip codes experience a 4% increase in the average number of
branches statewide (from 1.30 to 1.35), while minority zip codes experi-
ence a significant decline (from 2.11 to 1.87, a reduction of over 10%). In
short, there appears to be a substantial and consistent association be-
tween the changes in branch availability and the income, poverty, and
racial characteristics of Texas zip codes. Low-income areas, high-poverty
areas, and high-minority areas all experienced a decline in the availability
88. A separate analysis was done of the number of areas that experienced an increase
or decrease in the number of branches during the period of the study. These results are
consistent with and support the analysis presented in Tables Two and Three.
89. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
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of branches between 1985 and 1993, a time when the number of branches
was increasing or staying constant for high-income, low-poverty, and low-
minority areas.
The two-mile radius definition of the market exhibits patterns similar
to the zip code definition. The number of bank and SLA branches de-
clines for low-income market areas from an average of 2.37 in 1985 to
2.22 in 1993. Availability of facilities also fell for those areas with the
highest incidence of poverty (while increasing in areas with low poverty
rates). Again, dominantly white economic areas experienced a slight in-
crease in the average number of branches while minority areas exper-
ienced a substantial decline (from 3.30 to 3.04).
Table Two also presents the branch data for the three major geographic
areas-major urban areas, other metropolitan statistical areas, and non-
metropolitan statistical areas. The patterns for the major urban areas are
perhaps most interesting and relevant to the issue under investigation.
For these major urban areas-those that comprise about 60% of the pop-
ulation of the state-the changes in the number of branches are also
closely related to the income, poverty, and racial characteristics of the
areas. For example, focusing on zip codes, the high-income quartiles ex-
perienced an increase in the number of branches (from 4.06 to 4.18) while
the lowest-income quartile experienced a decline (from 2.37 to 2.29). The
pattern is similar for the two-mile radius areas.
While the patterns for the other MSA and non-MSA zip codes are sim-
ilar to those just discussed, two characteristics of these data are particu-
larly noteworthy. First, the decline in the availability of facilities is much
more pronounced for these areas than for the major urban areas. Indeed,
most of the decline in branches took place outside the major urban areas.
This decline may reflect differences in the economic prosperity among
these areas or it may be associated with the shift in the state's banking
structure towards large, statewide branching systems, often owned by
out-of-state banking organizations. Second, the absolute decline in
branches is quite pronounced in the other MSAs and the non-MSAs. The
largest declines in the availability of offices when the data are classified
by income levels, distribution, and minority status took place in the
smaller metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas of the state. For exam-
ple, the lowest-income quartile zip codes in the other MSAs experience a
28.5 % reduction in the number of branches per zip code (25.9 % using the
two-mile radius measure). In addition, for the highest-poverty quartile
zip codes in non-MSAs, the reduction in the number of branches is
19.0% .90
90. This pattern is also observed when the analysis focuses on the number of areas that
experience increases or decreases in the number of their branches. For example, 28% of
the zip codes in the lowest-income quartile in the other MSA group experienced a decline
in the number of branches in both 1985 and 1993 (versus only 16% experiencing an in-
crease). This is a much larger relative decline than in the major urban areas.
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Table 2
Average Number of Commercial Banks and Savings and Loan
Branches (Combined) per Zip Code and per Two-Mile Radius in
Texas, 1985 and 1993, Classified by Income Rank, Poverty Rank,
and Minority Rank
Zip Code Two-Mile Radius
1985 1993 A 1985 1993 A
TOTAL TEXAS 2.04 L93 -0.11 2.66 2.52 -0.13
INCOME Lowest Income Quartile 1.54 1.38 -0.17 2.37 2.22 -0.15
RANK Highest Income Quartile 2.54 2.55 0.01 3.33 3.31 -0.02
POVERTY Lowest Poverty Quartile 1.71 1.84 0.13 1.95 2.07 0.13
RANK Highest Poverty Quartile 2.03 1.76 -0.26 3.12 2.86 -0.26
MINORITY Lowest Non-Hispanic White Quartile 2.11 1.87 -0.24 3.30 3.04 -0.25
RANK Highest Non-Hispanic White Quartile 1.30 1.35 0.05 1.66 1.68 0.02
MAJOR URBAN AREAS 3.03 3.02 -0.01 4.69 4.66 -0.03
INCOME Lowest Income Quartile 2.37 2.29 -0.08 4.54 4.55 0.01
RANK Highest Income Quartile 4.06 4.18 0.11 6.29 6.36 0.08
POVERTY Lowest Poverty Quartile 3.02 3.27 0.25 3.67 3.94 0.27
RANK Highest Poverty Quartile 2.84 2.65 -0.19 5.84 5.69 -0.15
MINORITY Lowest Non-Hispanic White Quartile 2.79 2.68 -0.12 6.02 5.88 -0.14
RANK Highest Non-Hispanic White Quartile 2.24 2.36 0.12 3.13 3.24 0.11
OTHER MSA 2.22 1.97 -0.25 2.54 2.20 -0.34
INCOME Lowest Income Quartile 2.14 1.53 -0.61 2.66 1.97 -0.69
RANK Highest Income Quartile 3.23 3.15 -0.07 3.41 3.28 -0.13
POVERTY Lowest Poverty Quartile 2.14 2.25 0.11 2.22 2.27 0.05
RANK Highest Poverty Quartile 2.76 2.25 -0.51 3.23 2.66 -0.56
MINORITY Lowest Non-Hispanic White Quartile 2.48 2.16 -0.33 2.97 2.59 -0.38
RANK Highest Non-Hispanic White Quartile 1.86 1.73 -0.13 2.18 1.94 -0.24
NON-MSA 1.29 1.16 -0.13 1.29 1.16 -0.13
INCOME Lowest Income Quartile 0.78 0.70 -0.08 0.78 0.70 -0.08
RANK Highest Income Quartile 1.24 1.20 -0.04 1.25 1.20 -0.04
POVERTY Lowest Poverty Quartile 0.67 0.73 0.06 0.68 0.73 0.05
RANK Highest Poverty Quartile 1.21 0.98 -0.23 1.21 0.98 -0.23
MINORITY Lowest Non-Hispanic White Quartile 1.53 1.23 -0.30 1.53 1.23 -0.30
RANK Highest Non-Hispanic White Quartile 0.45 0.50 0.06 0.45 0.50 0.05
Table Three shows the number of facilities per 10,000 population for
the zip code as well as for the two-mile radius definition of the market
area. Looking initially at the entire state, we note that the number of
offices per 10,000 population fell (from 4.17 to 3.98) in the lowest-income
zip codes but increased in the highest-income zip codes (from 3.12 to
3.23). Using a two-mile radius measure of the market area, we observe
that the number of branches per 10,000 population decreased for both the
highest- and the lowest-income areas.
BANKING: A TEXAS EMPIRICAL STUDY
A similar pattern is evident when we examine the distribution of in-
come within a given area rather than its level (as proxied by the percent-
age of the population below the poverty level). Market areas with a large
percentage of the population living below the poverty level experienced
declines in the availability of facilities while market areas with a small
percentage of the population in poverty experienced increases in the
availability of facilities (whether measured by zip code or the two-mile
radius). Dividing the market areas by the minority status of the popula-
tion produced similar results.
Table Three also shows the number of facilities per 10,000 population
broken into the major metropolitan areas, the smaller metropolitan areas,
and the rural areas. For the major metropolitan areas, whether classified
by income levels, poverty status, or racial status, the patterns are consis-
tent with those reported for the entire state: low-income areas, higher-
poverty areas, and high-minority areas experienced declines in the availa-
bility of facilities whether the market is measured in terms of zip codes or
a two-mile radius definition. The patterns are similar for both the other
MSAs and the non-MSAs. For the other MSAs, the lowest-income quar-
tiles experienced a decline in the average number of branches per 10,000
population while the highest-income quartiles experienced more than a
10% increase. For the non-SMSA zip codes, the lowest-income quartiles
exhibited a decline from 3.22 to 3.03 (per 10,000 population) while the
highest-income quartiles show a slight increase in the number of
branches.
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Table 3
Average Number of Commercial Banks and Savings and Loan
Branches (Combined) per 10,000 Population per Zip Code and per
Two-Mile Radius in Texas, 1985 and 1993, Classified by Income Rank,
Poverty Rank, and Minority Rank
TOTAL TEXAS
INCOME Lowest Income Quartile
RANK Highest Income Quartile
POVERTY Lowest Poverty Quartile
RANK Highest Poverty Quartile
MINORITY Lowest Non-Hispanic White Quartile
RANK Highest Non-Hispanic White Quartile
MAJOR URBAN AREAS
INCOME Lowest Income Quartile
RANK Highest Income Quartile
POVERTY Lowest Poverty Quartile
RANK Highest Poverty Quartile
MINORITY Lowest Non-Hispanic White Quartile
RANK Highest Non-Hispanic White Quartile
OTHER MSA
INCOME Lowest Income Quartile
RANK Highest Income Quartile
POVERTY Lowest Poverty Quartile
RANK Highest Poverty Quartile
MINORITY Lowest Non-Hispanic White Quartile
RANK Highest Non-Hispanic White Quartile
NON-MSA
INCOME Lowest Income Quartile
RANK Highest Income Quartile
POVERTY Lowest Poverty Quartile
RANK Highest Poverty Quartile
MINORITY Lowest Non-Hispanic White Quartile






























































We separately analyzed the determinants of the changes in the number
of branches in terms of the multivariate model discussed above. Analyses
were done using income levels, percentage of the population with in-
comes below the poverty level, and minority status of the population.
Since these analyses provide consistent results, we focus on income levels
as the independent variable in the interest of brevity. This focus on in-
come levels is also consistent with the CRA's focus on low- and moder-
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ate-income neighborhoods.9'
Tables Four and Five provide the results of the multivariate analysis
using the income variable. In this procedure, the number of facilities for
each market area in 1993 is regressed upon: (a) the population of the
market area (this allows us to control for the fact that population varies
considerably among market areas); (b) the number of branches in 1985
(to deal with the regression to the mean phenomenon discussed earlier);
and (c) dummy variables contrasting the lowest-income rank group to the
highest (1 if zip code is low-income, 0 if moderate-, and -1 if highest-
income) and the middle-income rank group to the highest (1 if zip code is
middle-income, 0 if low-income, and -1 if highest-income). The coeffi-
cient of the Lowest-Income Rank dummy variable is of particular interest
because it provides evidence on the question of whether there is a signifi-
cant association between the change in the number of branches and the
income rank of the market area once the population of the market area
and the number of branches in 1985 are held constant. 92 A negative coef-
ficient indicates that, ceteris paribus, the lowest-income areas are associ-
ated with a greater decline (or conversely lower increase) in the number
of branches than that present in otherwise similar highest-income areas.
Tables Four and Five also present the results of "t" tests to determine the
statistical significance of the difference between the lowest- and highest-
income level market areas. Table Four used the zip code measure of the
market area while Table Five used the two-mile radius measure.
Table Four shows that there is a negative and statistically significant
association between the income rank and the change in the number of
branches in Texas zip codes between 1985 and 1993. Holding population
and the number of branches in 1985 constant, the lowest-quartile income
zip codes experienced a loss of bank branches. This statistically signifi-
cant decline is observed for Texas as a whole, for the major MSAs, and
for the other MSAs; however, in the non-MSAs, the sign of the coeffi-
cient, while negative, is not statistically significant. The sign of the varia-
ble denoting middle-income rank status is also negative and statistically
significant. The importance of income rank in its association with
changes in the number of branches is reinforced by the "t" tests, which
show statistically significant differences between the lowest- and highest-
income MSAs for the entire state, the major MSAs, and the other MSAs
(but not for the non-MSAs).93
91. See supra notes 19-28 and accompanying text.
92. The number of branches in 1985 already reflects the underlying banking demand
in a zip code, including the effects of such factors as zip code population, income, and racial
distribution. Assuming that population, income, or racial distribution did not change radi-
cally between 1985 and 1993, the significance of the income rank on the change in number
of branches reflects a relative change of focus by banks and S&Ls from low-income to
high-income neighborhoods.
93. An alternative interpretation of these findings might be that the Texas energy and
banking crisis affected neighborhoods differently. Our analysis already controls for the
possibility that cities or SMSAs were affected differently by the crisis by defining income




Determinants of Changes in Bank and Savings and Loan




Texas MSAs MSAs MSAs
Intercept 0.34*** 0.57*** 0.79*** 0.13*
(5.2) (3.7) (4.3) (2.4)
Population 0.01'** 0.01 "* 0.01 ** 0.01 '**
(8.7) (3.7) (5.2) (7.6)
1985 Branch Level 0.76*** 0.80*** 0.54*** 0.60***
(61.9) (41.7) (16.5) (28.1)
Lowest Income Rank -0.38*** -0.56** -0.66*** -0.08
(4.4) (2.9) (3.5) (1.2)
Middle Income Rank -0.27*** -0.41* -0.66*** -0.07
(3.7) (2.5) (3.5) (1.2)
Least Squares Mean
Lowest 1.78 2.81 1.66 1.14
Medium 1.89 2.96 1.85 1.14
Highest 2.16 3.37 2.51 1.22
R2  0.81 0.82 0.71 0.81
F value (no income effect
on branch change) 10.7*** 4.7*** 8.4*** 0.92
t-value 4.4*** 2.9** 3.8*** 1.2
(Lowest versus Highest)
t indicates statistical significance at the .1 level
* indicates statistical significance at the .05 level
** indicates statistical significance at the .01 level
* indicates statistical significance at the .001 level
differently based on their income distribution, the observed changes in number of branches
might reflect changes in demand for banking services rather than a relative redistribution
of branches due to regulatory changes.
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Table 5
Determinants of Changes in Bank and Savings and Loan




Texas MSAs MSAs MSAs
Intercept 0.20* 0.41* 0.82*** 0.12*
(2.6) (2.0) (4.3) (2.4)
Population 0.01 0.01 0.01*** 0.01"**
(3.4)*** (1.4) (5.3) (7.6)
1985 Branch Level 0.90*** 0.92*** 0.55*** 0.69***
(114.4) (80.0) (18.8) (28.1)
Lowest Income Rank -0.21" -0.21 -0.73** -0.08
(2.1) (0.90) (3.2) (1.1)
Middle Income Rank -0.25** -0.37t -0.66*** -0.07
(2.9) (1.8) (3.4) (1.2)
Least Squares Mean
Lowest 2.49 4.68 1.99 1.14
Medium 2.45 4.52 2.05 1.15
Highest 2.70 4.89 2.71 1.21
R2  0.91 0.93 0.72 0.81
F value (no income effect
on branch change) 4.4* 1.7 6.7** 0.8
t-value 2.1* 0.9 3.15** 1.2
(Lowest versus Highest)
t indicates statistical significance at the .1 level
* indicates statistical significance at the .05 level
** indicates statistical significance at the .01 level
* indicates statistical significance at the .001 level
Similar patterns exist for the two-mile radius definition of the market
area. The signs of the coefficient are negative for the lowest-income rank
areas and statistically significant for the entire state and for the other
MSAs (but not for the major MSAs and the non-MSAs). For the middle-
income rank areas, the signs are also negative (and significant for all the
metropolitan areas). Also, "t" tests reveal significant differences between
the lowest-income rank areas and the highest-income rank areas for
changes in the number of branches for the entire state and for the other
MSAs.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The profound regulatory changes that took place in Texas in the late
1980s provide a unique laboratory in which to explore the effects of such
change on the availability of bank and SLA facilities to the community
generally, and especially to subsets of the community such as low-income
and minority areas. Previous academic research suggests that the shift to
state-wide branch banking should have increased the availability of these
banking facilities. In Texas, however, during the relevant time period,
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this did not happen. Indeed, the number of offices of commercial banks
and SLAs declined slightly.
Perhaps more significant from a public policy perspective, however, is
the change which occurred in the distribution of facilities throughout the
state. Consistent with our a priori expectations and with prior research,
the availability of facilities did increase in upper-income areas. Access to
banking services as measured by the availability of offices, however, de-
clined in low-income areas. This decline occurred despite the greater em-
phasis on providing banking services to low- and moderate-income areas
that was mandated by FIRREA's 1989 amendments to the CRA. While
we can only speculate about the reasons for these changes, the fact re-
mains that, despite the provisions of the CRA, there has been a decline in
the availability of bank and SLA facilities in low-income areas in Texas in
recent years. Consequently, our data appears to throw into some ques-
tion whether the Riegle-Neal Act's move toward nationwide branch
banking will have a positive impact on bank and SLA facility availability
in low-income areas in the country.
